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Abortion and the Crime-Sin Spectrum*
WiLLAB D. LORENSEN"*
Abortion has rapidly become a matter of widespread public
discussion in recent years. New books on the subject have come
forth, magazine articles questioning the soundness of present
policies towards abortion are commonplace, a widely publicized
conference on the abortion issue was recently held in Washington,
D. C.' In a matter of less than a decade, abortion has ceased to be a
matter which was almost taboo and unfit for public discussion to
a matter that is now pervasively examined in all the public media.
Actual change of the abortion laws in three states, Colorado, North
Carolina and California, demonstrates that there is more than merely
talk involved.2 A modernizing band-wagon movement is in motion.
State legislatures, notorious for their propensity to imitate, are now
faced with an obvious challenge to the status quo.3 The next several
years will no doubt see an increasing legislative concern for abortion
laws. Clearly a change in the West Virginia criminal law in regard
to abortion is needed.4 However, I suggest that the pressure to
follow the popular 'liberalizing" version is not the soundest policy
available. Before West Virginia rushes forward to become modern
and liberal "like" California and such states, it would be wise to
note the relationship between the present movement towards
abortion law reform and a less notorious concurrent debate that
concerns itself with the relationship between crime and sin. The
arguments that have been raised in that debate suggest a sound
* This paper is an outgrowth of a lecture originally given April 21, 1967
at West Virginia University as one of the University Centennial distinguished
faculty lecture series.
** Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
' See, e.g., LADEn, ABORTION (1966); TnE CASE FOR LEGALIZED Anon-
TION Now (Guttmacher ed. 1967); DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAw (1966);
ScnRi, Crmiis WrroTr Vicnims (1966); WLIAMs, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
AN Cmasn.AL LAw (1957); Symposium-Abortion and the Law, 17
W. RS L. REv. 369-568 (1965). For brief summaries of the Washington,
D. C. conference proceedings see Time, Sept. 15, 1967, at 84; Newsweek,
Sept. 18, 1967, at 60-61.
2 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967, at 1, col. 9, in regard to the new abortion
law in England.
3 An Associated Press report from Chicago, dated April 10, 1967, indicated
attempts at abortion law reform were undertaken in approximately one-half
the states in 1967.
4 The matter of abortion law reform came before the Interim Committee
of the West Virginia Legislature in July, 1967. See Charleston Gazette, July
17, 1967, at 2, cols. 1-2.
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structure on which the movement towards abortion law reform
may be evaluated.
The West Virginia statute condemning abortions is as follows:5
Any person who shall administer to, or cause to be taken
by, a woman, any drug or other thing, or use any means,
with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion
or miscarriage, and shall thereby destroy such child, or
produce such abortion or miscarriage, shall be guilty of a
felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the peni-
tentiary not less than three nor more than ten years; and if such
woman die by reason of such abortion performed upon her,
such person shall be guilty of murder. No person, by reason
of any act mentioned in this section, shall be punishable where
such act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving
the life of such woman or child.
This statute came to us from the Virginia Code of 18496 and quite
clearly is a descendant of the first English statute on abortion
enacted by Parliament in 1803.' The common law attitude towards
abortion is not altogether clear. It seems that aborting a woman
after "quickening" was deemed an offense but aborting a woman
prior to that time probably was not.8 The Parliamentary act of 1803
continued to stress the importance of "quickening", treating the
offense before quickening as non-capital and the offense after
quickening as a capital offense.9 It would be improper of course
to conclude that abortion after quickening was equated with
5 W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 8 (Michie 1966). It is interesting to
note that the West Virginia provision is included in the article dealing with
offenses against the person.
6 VM-UNA CODE OF 1849, tit. 54, § 8. There is a marginal reference in
this volume to English statutes, 1 Viet. c. 85, § 6 (1837). This was the act
that eliminated the death penalty for abortion in England and abolished the
distinction in the offense based upon quickening. See note 9 infra.
7 Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803).
8 Compare Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949) which
states that it was not an indicatable offense at common law to abort a woman
before the child had quickened with Willis v. O'Brien, 153 S.E.2d 178 (W.
Va. 1967) which says abortion generally was a misdemeanor at common law.
3 Coke's Inst. * 50 states: "If a woman be quick with childe and by a potion
or otherwise killeth in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe this is a great mis-
prison, and no murder; but, if a childe be borne alive, and dieth of the potion,
battery or other cause, this is murder .. " See generally Davis, The Law of
Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REv. 126, 133-34 (1938).
9 See Anon., 3 Camp. 73, 170 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1811) concerning the
application of the quickening standard.
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homicide because of the imposition of the capital punishment. The
offense was added to the criminal statutes of England at a time
when the use of the death penalty for relatively trivial offenses was
commonplace. In 1837, as a part of the reform movement elimin-
ating the death penalty for many offenses from the criminal law
of England, the death penalty was abolished for the offense of
abortion and the distinction between abortion before and after
quickening was abandoned. '0 The Virginia and West Virginia
statutes that evolved on this topic ignored the quickening distinc-
tion. However, the Virginia, and consequently the West Virginia
statute, expressly stated the defense of necessity where this was not
a part of the English statute."
It is noteworthy that the fundamental policy in regard to
criminal abortion was formed shortly after the turn of the 19th
century at a time when scientific knowledge concerning human
embryology and procreation was quite primitive. 2 The cell theory
had not yet been developed, the biological processes of conception
were unknown. The legal policy in regard to abortion also evolved
about a century before it became possible publicly to evaluate the
pros and cons of family planning and birth control. In sum, the
present-day abortion law is the product of an age in which knowl-
edge of the fundamental biology of reproduction and attitudes
toward the control of this phenomena by human means were
markedly different than they are today.
While public attitudes towards birth control have changed
enormously and the criminal sanctions against such sins as fornica-
tion have atrophied, abortion law and policy have remained stead-
fast during the past century and a half. Abortion was immune to the
forces that modified and reshaped attitudes towards other similar
matters related to the sexual ethic of the American civilization. This
inflexibility resulted in large measure from the unique impact of the
abortion laws. Such laws placed great and effective pressure upon
a pivotal group-the legitimate medical practitioner. With a hard
won and highly valuable professional career at stake, the physician
was effectively dissuaded from risking any substantial shift in
abortion law policy by challenging the rigid formulation of the law
10 1 Vict. c. 85, § 6 (1837).
" 'Rex Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, discussed in Davis, The Law of
Abortion and the Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REv. 126 (1938).
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by violation. 3 The large mass of the demand for abortion flowed
around legitimate medical channels and into the illicit trade.1 4 The
image of abortion was one of a foul, dirty and evil business, quite
beyond the pale of justification. It took a dramatic event to trans-
form the issue into one that was suitable for dispassionate public
consideration. That dramatic event was the Finkbine case.
The Sherri Finkbine case propelled the abortion issue into the
national spotlight. In 1962, Mrs. Finkbine, the mother of four
children and the hostess of children's nursery program on local
television, discovered that she had taken thalidomide during the
early stages of her pregnancy. She noticed brief news items relating
to the birth of malformed infants in England traced to a "tran-
quilizer" and became concerned because she had taken a tran-
quilizer that her husband had obtained in England while he was
there on a business trip. She pursued the matter through her
physician who found she had indeed taken the dread drug,
thalidomide. He recommended an abortion. The matter was
cleared with the hospital medical board and the operation was
scheduled. Fearing other expectant mothers might be unaware of
their similar plights, Mrs. Finkbine called the local paper and sug-
gested a news story warning of the dangers involved. The news
story appeared, but not as a somber warning. Rather it was a
dramatic revelation that a local woman anticipated an abortion
to avoid the birth of a thalidomide monster then common in
Europe. The disclosure evoked national attention, and aroused
intense local interest in the case. The inexorable dictates of jour-
nalism demanded follow-up stories that presented prosecutorial
prognostications. The quiet approval originally given the abortion
was now reconsidered in the intense glare of widespread public con-
cern. Hospital authorities sought a declaratory judgment seeking
some reassurance and some sharing of responsibility in light of the
possible criminal consequences that were present. The local court
apparently avoided the merits of the case by ruling that there was
3 See generally LADna, ABORTION, cb. 4 (1966) for a vigorous criticism
of the hospital-medical control of abortion policy. Shur criticizes Lader's book
on this point and says the arbitrariness of abortion policy cannot be legitimately
blamed upon the medical profession or hospital administrators generally.
See Shur, Book Review, NATON, Nov. 7, 1966, at 492.
14 Speculation on the magnitude of illegal abortion activity has produced
widely varied estimates. These are collected in the comments to the Model
Penal Code abortion provision with figures ranging from 333,000 to 2,000,000
illegal abortions annually occuring in the United States. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.11 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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no discernible controversy between the parties named in the suit
and the case was dismissed. The suit disclosed the identity of Mrs.
Finkbine as the mother involved and a torrent of national attention
became focused upon her plight. She decided upon a trip to Sweden
to seek an abortion there and was successful in having the opera-
tion performed. 5
The Finkbine case dramatized several facts that have made the
present open and vigorous discussion of abortion law policy pos-
sible. The character of the principals involved was significant. It
emphasized that abortions might be sought by very respectable
people for reasons that could win the sympathy of a broad spectrum
of American society."6 The idea that abortion was the resort of
loose women seeking to avoid the consequences of vulgar, illicit
trysts was punctured. Additionally, the extreme rigidity of present-
day abortion law was etched in bold relief. The obvious threat of
a grossly deformed child ran a shudder down the spine of many
respectable, responsible parents. That such considerations were
irrelevant in terms of present law struck many as incongruous.
Anyone who has waited out the last anxious moments of a preg-
nancy, waiting for the reassuring words that the baby is normal
could share the anxiety of a prospective parent faced with the very
real and grave threat posed by the thalidomide disaster. The
heartless dogmatism of the American law was further underscored
by the resolution of the Finkbine affair in Sweden, a nation held
in high esteem by many Americans. The crisp, antiseptic, scientific
approach of the Swedish system held considerable appeal for a
nation that prizes technology and science generally and admires
scientific solutions to difficult problems. Abortion was no longer
an epithet. It could now be comingled in public discussion with
the term therapeutic which cleansed it in the public eye from its
formerly automatic pejorative thrust.
The present-day abortion law reform movement is largely a
product of the ripple of national attention that followed in the
Is See SHERRI Fnknixm, The Lesser of Two Evils, in THE CASE FOR
LEGALIZED ABORTION Now (Guttmacher ed. 1967); LADnR, ABORTION, ch. 2
(1966).16 Williams cites a study by A. Davis in 2 BITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 123
(1950) that showed out of 2,665 abortions studied 88% were performed on
married women. WILLIAMS, SANCTITY OF LIFE IN Tm CrmuiN.AL LAW, ch. 6,
p. 11, N. 2. (1957). Other studies show similar predominance though in less
sizeable proportions. See BATES AND ZAWADZY, CRIMINAL ABORTION, ch. 4
(1964); ABORTION IN THE UNrrIE STATES (Cafderone ed. 1958); GERHARD,
PREGNANCY, BmRTH AND ABORTION, ch. 8 (1958).
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wake of the Finkbine case. The model around which the reform
movement has rallied was not long in being identified. It came
from the American Law Institute Model Penal Code and was of
such nature that it could be conveniently removed from that
broader work and treated as a separate entity.'7 The Model Penal
Code provision carried forward the generally accepted justification
defense as it is known today which permits an abortion to be per-
formed to "save the life" of the mother involved. Beyond this,
the Model Code provision cautiously advanced certain other limited
exceptions to the continued stringent criminal penalties for abortion.
The new grounds advanced which would justify the abortion are:
(1) that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother, thus relaxing the generally
accepted justification defense as it is now known; (2) where
there is a substantial risk that the child would be born with a
grave physical or mental defect, thus, encompassing specifically
the type of situation that arose in the Finkbine case; (3) and where
the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious inter-
course. The comments to the Model Penal Code provision advanced
telling arguments for expanding the exceptions to the general pro-
scription of the abortion operation that emanates from existing
codes. The more fascinating aspect of the Model Penal Code pro-
vision and its supporting commentary is the absence of any very
telling argument for continuation of the broad restraints upon
abortion that history has foisted upon us.'"
The draftsmen of the Code were obviously aware of the close
relationship between the abortion law issue and the more pervasive
problem of the proper relationships between the criminal law and
the moral precepts of the community. This matter was carefully
considered in a lucid analysis of abortion law policy which was a
part of the Carpentier Lectures delivered at Columbia University
in 1956 by Glanville Williams, a leading English criminal law
scholar.' 9 This work was noted several times in the detailed com-
ments which accompanied the tentative draft of the Model Penal
Code provision. Indeed, the Institute had previously confronted
this same issue while formulating a policy concerning such crimes
,7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (P.O.D. 1962).
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
'9 The lectures were published as THE SANCTrrY OF LnrE AND THE CuMI-
NAL LAW. Williams is also author of CramiNAL LAw, Tim GENEaIAL PART (2d
ed. 1961) and other important works on criminal law and its administration.
1967]
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as fornication, adultery and consensual homosexual conduct."
In these instances the Institute opted for a secular criminal code
which left a considerable range of conduct to bend to private moral
decision. One of the best remembered floor debates of the Insti-
tute proceedings centered on this very issue when two federal cir-
cuit judges of renown, Learned Hand and Charles Parker, argued
this very issue in 1955.21 On that occasion, the Institute followed
the utilitarian view advanced by Judge Hand and omitted from the
criminal code sanctions against acts that may violate moral beliefs
of the majority (private consensual homosexual conduct in private)
but posed no outward threat to the peace, safety or security of the
community. Nonetheless, when the Institute focused its attention
on the abortion issue, the question of the relationship between
the criminal law and majority morality was quite subdued and
tangential.
The comments on the abortion section produce little positive
argument to support the continuation of the abortion offense in
the criminal code at all. About the only positive statement found
in these comments that directly supports the continued restrictions
on the abortion operation is that "indiscriminate abortion must be
adjudged a secular evil since the procedure involves some physical
and psychic hazards."2 Stretched as far as this argument will
reach, it leaves an enormous gap between the premise (a secular
criminal code does not punish mere immorality) and the conclusion
(abortion is an evil to be suppressed by grevious penalty with only
careful and cautiously carved exceptions allowed). After all, any
surgery involves risk. Why abortion is singled out from the wide
range of surgical techniques employed for a variety of reasons is
not explained. The alternative argument, the risk created by the
psychic hazards of abortion, deserves more careful consideration
than merely a superficial statement.23 It seems quite ludicrous
to assume that there is no psychic risk involved when an abortion
operation is denied to a woman who seriously desires to terminate
20 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955):
"The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely
moral or religious standards. We deem it in appropriate for the government
to attempt to control behavior that has no such substantial significance as to
the morality of the actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educational
and other social influences .. "
21 The debate is recorded in TME, May 30, 1955, at 13.
22 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.11, (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 150.
23 See generally Scsrs, CtmRWs WITHOUT VicTms 32-45 (1965); LADEn,
ABORTnON, ch. 3 (1966).
[Vol. 70
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her pregnancy. The psychic risk is there because of the pregnancy.
It is not uniquely created by the abortion operation. To justify
continuance of the criminal penalty for abortion on this basis is to
pretend that problems will go away if they are simply ignored.
The lack of a clearly articulated rationale for perpetuating
criminal penalties for abortion leaves a puzzling gap in the Model
Penal Code. At this point, the Code may be a model statement of
what is deemed politically feasible, but it is hardly a model of
consistent adherence to basic principles. 4 The faint hearted justifi-
cations of the abortion provisions proceed from quite a different
premise than the more rigorously examined rationales that lie
behind provisions affecting sexual conduct generally. With such
offenses, the drafters assumed the burden of demonstrating a harm
before they felt justified in proposing a criminal charge. In regard
to abortion, the process was reversed, the harm was assumed and
the drafters undertook the burden of justifying the cautious ex-
ceptions posed. The relationship between abortion and the concept
of sin and objective, secular harm as it was viewed in the general
sex offense provisions was left terribly vague.
A most fruitful dialogue on the proper relationship between
crime and sin rather, has proceeded quite apart from the abortion
law reform movement, sparked by a statement in the Wolfenden
Report.2" This report was a study by leading English citizens
recommending policies for English law in regard to homosexual
offenses and prostitution. At one point the committee succinctly
stated: "Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society,
acting through the agency of the law, to equate this sphere of
crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality
and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business."2"
This crisply British epigram triggered a debate that has continued
to the present day. The Wolfenden Committee was given a specific
24 See Schwartz, Abortion and 19th Century Laws, TkL., June-July 1967
at 41, 45. Schwartz, a co-reporter of the Model Penal Code concludes this
brief argument for the American Law Institute position thus: "Many feel that
morality and proper limits on governmental interference with personal choice
called for a broader justification than those (advanced in the Model Penal
Code). . . in recommending a moderate liberalization, the American Law
Institute simply took realistic account of the intensity of feeling on this issue."2 5 REPORT OF THE COM2TT.EE ON HoimrosExuAL OFFENSES AND PROSTI-
TUITION (CMD 247) 1957.2
6 Id. at par. 61.
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charge regarding homosexual offenses and prostitution and sought
to formulate a principle as to the proper role of the criminal law
in regard to such concerns. The principle that was adopted however
has provoked a broader concern and the ensuing debate contributes
much towards a productive basis for consideration of the current
abortion law issues. In fairness to the Wolfenden Committee it
should be noted that it sought to speak in regard to the relatively
narrow area of interest that was committed to its study. In setting
forth its approach, the Committee posed the question: "What acts
ought to be punished by the State?" and then reached its "own
formulation of the function of the criminal law so far as it concerns
the subjects of this inquiry." The proper role of the criminal law,
the Committee concluded, was stated in the following terms:
In this field, its function, as we see it, is to preserve public
order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive
or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against ex-
ploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who
are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body
or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical,
official or economic dependence.'
When these statements are considered in the light of the recom-
mendations of the Committee to abolish criminal penalties for
private acts of homosexual conduct by adults committed in private,
it becomes quite clear that a significant challenge had been made
to the criminal law. The wider implications of that challenge could
hardly escape examination. Lord Devlin sought to seek out the
implications of the Wolfenden position by a broad examination
of its impact upon the criminal law of England. When this raised
many difficult problems, Lord Devlin abandoned the principle
promoted by the Wolfenden Report and instead offered a counter-
principle in the Maccabaean lecture in jurisprudence delivered
in 1959.28 Lord Devlin was lead to this position because he could
not see, for example, how the law could properly continue to aim
27 Id. at par. 13.
28 DEvim, THE ENFoRCEmmNT OF MorAis (1965). "The Enforcement
of Morals" is the title both of the book published in 1965 and the lecture
which gave rise to the book. The lecture was delivered in 1959 as the Mac-
cabaean lecture in jurisprudence of the British Academy and is reprinted as
chapter one of the 1965 book under the new chapter title, "Morals and the
Criminal Law." The book includes a number of other papers by Lord Devlin
prepared subsequent to the 1959 lecture. All references to Devlin in this paper
are to the 1965 book.
[Vol. 70
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its preventative forces against polygamy or euthanasia without
ultimately justifying such policies on essentially moral grounds.
The fact that Lord Devlin was unconvinced by the Wolfenden
argument is not as important as his emphatic statement of a counter-
principle which tenders at least a vigorous theoretical support for
the status quo. He seeks to affirmatively justify the use of criminal
sanction to enforce standards that may be supported only by
reference to the moral consensus of the community on the basis
of society's right to preserve its own existence:
Society is entitled by means of its laws to protect itself from
dangers, whether from within or without .... The law of trea-
son is directed against aiding the king's enemies and against
sedition from within. The justification for this is that estab-
lished government is necessary for the existence of society and
therefore its safety against a violent overthrow must be
secured. But an established morality is as necessary as good
government for the welfare of society. Societies disintegrate
from within more frequently than they are broken up by
external pressures. There is disintegration when no common
morality is observed and history shows that the loosening of
moral bonds is*often the first stage of disintegration, so that
society is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its
moral code as it does to preserve its government and other
essential institutions ....
Lord Devlin's position looms important not only because it is a
strong, vigorous, articulate statement by a man of considerable
repute, but also because it grandly justifies the law that is. It
gains tremendous strength from the service it performs in reassur-
ing and comforting society that it has been right all along. The
statement legitimates, it relieves doubts that arise because some
in our midst insist that society should not confuse the common
with the necessary. Lord Devlin in large measure reassures us that
which is common is indeed very necessary.
Professor H. L. A. Hart has provided a most criptic counter to
this position. In his book Law, Liberty and Morality, Hart re-
sponds:
For he [Lord Devlin] appears to move from the acceptable
proposition that some shared morality is essential to the ex-
29 DEvLiN, TnE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965).
1967]
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
istence of any society to the unacceptable proposition that a
society is identical with its morality as that is at any given
moment of its history, so that a change in its morality is
tantamount to the destruction of a society . . .. [T]he latter
proposition is absurd. Taken strictly, it would prevent us
seeing that the morality of a given society bad changed, and
would compel us to instead say that one society has disappeared
and another taken its place .. .. o
When the original Devlin paper was republished following the
publication of Harts book, a lengthy footnote was employed to
respond to criticism offered by Professor Hart. Devlin explained
that he did not state that a society ended every time a moral
principle changed, but rather he was seeking primarily to demon-
strate that the principle espoused by the Wolfenden Committee
was invalid. Devlin asserts that his point was that the Wolfenden
view was unsound because every society has the right of self-
preservation and in certain instances the enforcement of certain
moral principles may be necessary to insure the continuation of
the society. In a telling illustration, Lord Devlin stressed in his
original text that while it might be difficult to discern a threat to
society created by a single man getting privately and quietly
drunk in his residence at night, a threat would nonetheless arise
if half a nation would follow such a practice regularly. Conse-
quently, he asserted, private moral decisions may indeed threaten
the viability of a society and therefore the Wolfenden position
cannot be viewed as an absolute or a principle. It is false, in his
mind, to assert that government never has the right to intrude
into matters of private moral decision."
But Devlin deems too much proven by suggesting that there
may be instances in which the cumulative effect of private con-
duct in moral matters poses a threat to the society. In seeking to
illustrate those instances in which society is justified in using
criminal sanctions to regulate private moral conduct, he pays little
heed to the consequences of the self-preservation argument. Rather
than tailor society's power to intrude in such affairs to those
instances which do in fact pose some cognizable threat, he seeks
a different basis for identifying those moral principles meriting
legal sanction. Acknowledging that mere majority preference is an
30 H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND THE MORALITY 51 (1966).
31 See D~vLN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 n. 1 (1965).
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inadequate standard, he turns instead to the common bond of
morality embraced by all right thinking Englishmen that would
demonstrate certain conduct as not only bad, but intolerable. The
English terminology refers to views of the man who rides the
Clapham Bus. In America, we would adopt the values of the
John Q. Public who has a sizeable mortgage on a suburban home.
The fault in adopting such moral principles as worthy of the succor
by criminal sanctions lies in the fact that there is no showing that
their support has anything at all to do with the safety of society.
Rather, as Professor Dworkin of Yale has pointed out, Lord Devlin's
proposition tends to justify prosecution of conduct merely because
certain kinds of people hate it enough. 2 Glanville Williams notes
this argument tends to reward intolerance.J
Professor Dworkin has taken the Devlin argument a step further.
While he does not concede the basic position of Lord Devlin
that a society is justified in seeking to control private moral
decisions, he puts that issue to the side in order to reach to another
fundamental problem. Assuming then that society is justified in
"following its own lights" as Professor Dworkin concedes arguendo,
a consequent issue arises as to how we identify those moral prin-
ciples which the law is justified in enforcing. Here Professor
Dworkin challenges Devlin's identification of a moral position. The
term "moral position" may convey two quite different meanings.
On the one hand it may describe a position which is worthy of
respect. On the other hand it may be used in a merely descriptive
sense as, for example, we could say the moral position of Nazi
Germany or a bitterly racist community represents the moral posi-
tion of that particular community. In the latter instances the
moral position of the community may not deserve respect when
tested by ground rules of reasoning and argumentation in such
affairs. Thus Professor Dworkin cautions, merely to label a position
as a moral one does not of itself justify the use of governmental
force to perpetuate it. To justify support that position should be
a legitimate and defensible one. Positions that are buttressed by
prejudice, emotion, parotting, misconception of the facts, etc. can-
not justifiably claim the support of the lawmaker in his decision
to invoke or continue the sanctions of the criminal law. To bring
32 Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J.
986 (1966).
33 Williams, Authoritarian Morals and the Criminal Law, 1966 CRinm.
L. REv. (Eng.) 132.
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this general line of analysis to bear upon the abortion issue, we
should properly ask whether, even conceding the right of the
government to intrude into areas of private moral decision, whether
the moral attitude of the community towards the issue is legitimate
or not."
The first major argument against reducing the existing criminal
law restrictions upon abortion falls outside the crime-sin spectrum
that I have been discussing above. There are elements of this
argument however that closely relate to this range of discussion.
This threshhold argument is that abortion should be a crime because
it involves the taking of a human life, and therefore is a form of
homicide. We need not labor long to demonstrate that the protec-
tion of human life is a proper goal of a purely secular code. The
difficulty with this argument in regard to the abortion issue is that
it so grieviously begs the question. The question, of course, is
when does human life begin. By pointing to conception or to the
time when the fertilized ovum attaches to the womb, this crucial
fact may be established literally at the onset of the pregnancy."
We cannot expect biologists, embryologists, or medical men or men
from any other branch of science to tell us when human life begins
in the context that we must deal with that term here. The issue
is one of policy, not of science. There are quite a number of
indications that bear rationally upon this policy decision which
indicate that the "taking of human life" argument is unsound.
First and quite obviously the traditional legal policy of our society
is quite to the contrary. Abortion has always been recognized as
an offense separate from homicide. To equate it with homicide
is to ignore this rather substantial distinction that has persisted in
our law. The deliberate taking of human life as life is recognized
under the law of homicide has always been viewed as a crime
34 Dworkin, supra n. 32. The article by Prof. Dworkin is rich in thought
and precisely written. Only a very modest hint of the quality of analysis
presented in Dworkin's paper is disclosed in the text above.
35Fertilization normally occurs while the ovum moves dovn the Fallopian
tubes towards the uterus, but successful pre nancy depends upon the connec-
tion of that fertilized ovum to the lining of the uterus. This process, called
implantation, usually occurs six to ten days after fertilization. See 5 LAWYERs
MEDicAL. ENCLYCLOPEDIA § 37.1 (1960) for a simplified description of this
phenomenon. See Note, 46 ORE. L. REv. 211 (1967) which speculates about
the so-called "morning after pill," and abortion law policy. The "morning
after pill" operates on a principal of altering body chemistry so that the lining
of the uterus repels fertilized ovum and thus prevents the normal pregnancy
through prior intercourse may have lead to the fertilization of the ovum.
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more heinous than the deliberate destruction of the fetus. 6 More-
over, the different treatment accorded the defense of necessity
under the law of abortion and the law of homicide emphasizes
the breadth of this distinction. It is commonly a defense to abortion
that the operation was performed to save the life of the mother."
The law of homicide, on the other hand, does not recognize it as
a defense that one innocent human life is taken in order to preserve
another. 8 There is another revealing factor to be considered-the
common reaction to spontaneous abortion early in pregnancy. This
phenonema is not treated in our society as the loss of human life.
The laws of the various states overwhelmingly regard the loss of the
fetus early in pregnancy as an event other than death. Health codes
commonly require the report of a stillbirth only when the preg-
nancy has proceeded to about the fifth month. 9 When pregnancy
terminates prior to that time, there is no birth nor death recorded.
The remains of the "product of conception"4' are disposed of as
anatomical waste and not as a human corpse. The common re-
sponse is not one of mourning the death of a child but of dis-
appointment over the loss of an opportunity to have a child. It
seems quite unsound to argue at this date that the tradition of all
legal policy which has viewed abortion as an offense distinct from
homicide should be moved within the homicide category. Stripped
of the emotional fervor that surrounds the decision to abort, our
society does not treat this phenonema as the loss of human life.
A variant on this line of argument that puts the matter less
ardently pushes our attention closer to the Devlin, Hart, Dworkin
concern for the proper role of the criminal law. This variation
3 6 During the priod when aborting a quickened woman was a capital
offense, 1803 to 1837 in England, there was a rough equating of abortion
and homicide. See notes 8 and 9 supra. See also DIcKENS, ABORTION ANM
THE LAW 20-22 (1966).
37 See summary in George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Move-
ments for Reform, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 371, 375-80 (1965).
" The classic case is Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D.
273, holding it to be no offense to murder or to slay a dying cabin boy to
provide food and drink for others starving in a life boat.
3 9
W. VA. CODE ch. 16, art. 5, § 6 (Michie 1966). Other statutes follow
similar patterns. See, e.g., Aiuz. BEv. STATS., ch. 3, art. 2, § 36-335 (1956);
DEL. CODE ANN., §§ 3124, 125 (supp. 1967); MicH. STATS. ANN. § 14.235
(Rev. Vol. 1956).,4 0 The term 'Product of Conception" is used in some statutes. It seems
rather clearly aimed at avoiding the anguish of dealing with labels in this
regard that might imply human life. The debate about abortion may be
giving rise to another euphanism-the "a disease of unwanted pregnancy."
See Tamv, Sept. 15, 1967 at 84 for a report on the Washington, D.C. confer-
ence on abortion at which such terminology was employed.
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suggests that though we cannot assert that the abortion operation
is the taking of human life, and admitting that it may be shown that
in other respects we do not view this phenonema as the loss of
human life, nonetheless we do not know that the operation does
not involve the taking of human life; therefore, the better policy
is not to reduce the restrictions presently imposed upon the
operation." This position gains a greater part of its strength from
traditional conservative values and the historic accident that we
presently have very stringent restrictions placed upon the abortion
operation. Such a position deftly links an admirable concern for
human life with a neat shifting of the burden of proof to the
proponents of change. The shifting of the burden of proof is the
crucial element here. As Glanville Williams has said, "The view
that human personality mystically begins with the fertilization of
the microscopic ovum cannot be refuted any more than it can
be proved."4 2 Thus, whoever bears the burden of proving when
human life begins automatically looses the argument. The caution-
ary-principle advanced here tends to become a corollary of the
ultimate conservative principle that we should never risk any
action for the first time. But, adject surrender to fate and to the
accidents of history do not resolve problems. The challenges of
life, no more than the inevitability of death cannot be put off until
a more convenient time-a time when, presumably, ultimate wisdom
may somehow force its way upon our admittedly imperfect per-
ception. The steady advance of science brings more and more
under the control of mankind and persistently pushes back the
perimeter of inevitability. To shrug off the human responsibility
of deciding what to do with this power, to pretend we still may
rely upon the unknown forces to command these choices for us,
is to shun responsibility, not to exercise caution.
Beyond these arguments that fall within the secular spectrum,
lies a considerable reluctance to reduce the public control of the
abortion operation. This is the right-thinking morality that Lord
Devlin recognized as worthy of support through criminal sanctions.
And here lies our final concerns.
If we are to take Lord Devlin's thesis to mean that society has
4' Address by Rev. Father Robert Scott, C. S. P. "Legalized Abortion" at
Jus et Factum conference on legalized abortion, Sept. 21, 1967, W. Va. Univ.
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a right to protect itself, continuation of the present extremely re-
strictive approach to abortion is difficult, if not impossible, to
justify. Can it really be rationally maintained that liberalization
of abortion law policy threatens in any meaningful sense the con-
tinued vitality of the society. Certainly the impact upon gross
population changes that would result from such a change in policy
is hardly any noteworthy factor. The very liberal attitudes of our
society towards birth control and family planning bear much more
directly on this issue and argue that the assumption of parental
responsibilities may, at the option of the individual, not the com-
munity, be made a matter of choice and not of chance.43 Indeed,
any threat to our social fabric that is premised upon the threat to
the size of the population is belied by the attitude of our society
in regard to much less drastic, yet more pervasive, birth control
measures. The point of departure, where a unique argument can
be raised in regard to abortion as opposed to methods that prevent
conception, can be maintained only when we concede that there
is a taking of human life in some manner involved in the abortion
operation. By extending this generalized threat to human security
through extreme projections it may be argued that abortion is only
a first step towards eugenic infanticide, genocide or euthanasia
that might lead to the rational dispatch of the senile when -they
become a burden upon society and other similarly ghoulish conse-
quences. But not every tree that is planted must grow up to
puncture the sky. We seem to be able to distinguish between
levying taxes upon property and confiscating the property in toto
without compensation; we have recognized divorce without abolish-
ing marriage; we acknowledged the right of self-defense without
obliterating the law of homicide. The abortion problem is unique
enough to be considered on its own merits. It does not follow
that shifting the difficult decision about abortion from the auto-
matic dogmatism of the criminal code to the arena of private
choice would pose any significant threat to the value of human life
generally as we now recognize it in our society. Only precarious
speculation can close the gap between the societal risk involved in
diverting the abortion decision to the private realm and Lord
Devlin's admittedly legitimate concern for society's right to protect
and perpetuate itself.
43 Certainly a most dramatic exemplification of our society's attitude
towards birth control is found in the Supreme Court decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Nonetheless, it is a fact that the moral sense of the community
remains no doubt quite antagonistic towards abortion. If the com-
munity is to "follow its own lights," to borrow Professor Dworkin's
term, certainly we must realistically recognize that there is a great
store of feeling that supports the present-day abortion law policy.
Professor Dworkin properly raised the point that the lawmaker
has a responsibility to use his best judgment to distinguish between
a moral sense of the community that just happens to exist and a
moral sense that is legitimate, rational and deserving of respect.
I suspect that much of the lingering anguish over the abortion
problem is not rationally founded and in my mind there is con-
siderable doubt as to whether this moral sense is deserving of such
formidable recognition as the law now accords it.
One interesting sideline on the public discussion of the abortion
issue has been the repeated reference to polls taken among physi-
cians and medical men as to their attitudes towards abortion law
reform. That the collective positions of medical men on such
issues is deemed relevant might indicate a revealing anxiety and
desire for "expert" guidance.44 The appropriate contribution which
medical men can make is rarely examined. The gross reaction of
the group surveyed is usually all that is reported. What leads the
medical men to these particular conclusions is apparently deemed
largely irrelevant in such surveys. The lingering doubts of physi-
cians may be provoked by the same kinds of uncertainties that
trouble the public generally. At a recent panel discussion on abor-
tion law,45 a gynecologist stated that though he favored some modi-
fication of the law he nonetheless harbored certain doubts and
retained a reluctance towards the abortion operation. When driven
to articulate his reason for this, he forthrightly explained that
these doubts lingered from 'lessons I learned at my mother's knee."
The remark is quite revealing. It suggests that much of the ani-
mosity towards the abortion operation is the product of an inherited
value system that is difficult to balance against objective argument.
When the rational arguments have been put aside, there still
lingers this doubt. Why? Perhaps these are some of the reasons.
44 See TmE, May 5, 1967, at 69, noting that a last minute letter cam-
paign by physicians directed to Gov. John Love of Colorado helped to avoid
a veto of the Colorado abortion reform law. In the same article the magazine
notes a survey of U.S. Physicians indicated 87% favored liberalizing abortion
laws.
4 Jus et Factum (W. Va. Student Bar Association Newspaper) forum on
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No doubt there is some connection between the abhorence for
abortion and the general warm and positive feelings that our
society holds toward the status of motherhood. Giving birth to
a child and assuming the role of mother is one of the positive
fulfillments of the woman's role in our society. Indeed, for women
in a large segment of our society, achieving motherhood as the
single most important accomplishment of the entire life span.46
The fact that we have a national holiday set aside to pay respect
to mothers is a further indication of the reverence paid the
status of mother. It is quite consistent with this warm and positive
attitude that abortion should provoke very opposite feelings and
emotions. Abortion is a dramatic and specific rejection of mother-
hood. While this reaction is understandable, the question of
whether it is rational remains to be examined. The thrust of this
antagonistic feeling exceeds the legitimate range. Rationally
viewed, abortion is not a rejection of motherhood generally, but
rather a rejection of a specific child-bearing opportunity. The num-
ber of potential opportunities for child-bearing reaches well over
three hundred for the normal, healthy woman. To terminate one
pregnancy which consumes only a fractional portion of this fertility
span obviously is not a total rejection of motherhood. Moreover,
in some instances, the desire for abortion is motivated by the desire
to sustain the capacity to perform adequately as a mother for
children already present in the family. In whatever degree the
lingering abhorence of the abortion operation is promoted by its
seeming automatic rejection of motherhood, that abhorence is
largely emotional and not rational.
There is yet another source of animosity in our society that grows
from essentially retributive feelings. There exists, no doubt, some
sense that those who become involved in unwanted pregnancies
"got caught" cheating on society's rules in regard to sexual conduct.
From this view then, abortion is an act which cheats fate of its
just rewards.4" The suppression of natural sexual desires and
channeling of these into socially accepted patterns of conduct have
long been fortified by the fear of unwanted pregnancy. Indeed
there is considerable consternation today that the increasingly
simple means of birth control that reduces the risk of unwanted
pregnancies may reek havoc with our sexual mores. The anguish
46 RAVATER, AND THE POOR GET CHILDREN 82-86 (1960).
4 Cf. Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality, 43 J. Cami.
L.C. & P.S. 73 (1964).
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caused by such suppression of sexual desire is somewhat amelior-
ated, rewarded negatively in a sense, when others are seen as
"paying the price" for overstepping the ground rules that society
has laid down about sexual conduct. This feeling of rightness,
that the punishment fits the crime, is no doubt reinforced by the
fact that in an American culture that admires achievement, con-
quest and acquisition, there is a natural feeling in the male-
sometimes strongly expressed in groups of young men-that status
and success are achieved by a wide range of sexual conquests and
achievements. The young man who has no record of achievement
in this field of endeavor may feel quite ambivalent about himself.
He may view his lack of success as failure, or as the product of
mature restraint. When others are observed in difficulties because
of unwanted pregnancies, there is a natural tendency to feel relief
that these are wrongful consequences properly avoided by sexual
abstinence. Doubts as to personal failure are more easily downed.
A self-image of rectitude is supported. The naturalness of preg-
nancy trouble is perpetuated and the attitudes towards abortion as
an unfair escape contributes to the general concept of abortion
as inherently evil.
Surveys of public opinion that have measured attitudes towards
modification of abortion laws have sought to measure the variety
of feeling conditioned upon the circumstances surrounding the
conception. These surveys indicate quite clearly that when the
intercourse resulting in pregnancy fell beyond the limits of tolerable
sexual conduct in our society, the support for allowing abortion
to terminate such pregnancies fell off sharply.4" This difference
of attitude is most readily explained by the prevalence of the feeling
that a pregnancy is just punishment for those who violate society's
48 See Rossi, Abortion Laws and Their Victims, TnANS-ACTXON Sept.-
Oct. 1966 at 7. Reporting on a survey of general adult opinion responses
showed that 71% would approve of abortion where a woman's health was in
danger; 56% would approve where pregnancy resulted from rape, but only 18%
would approve where the woman was unmarried and did not want to marry
the man who conceived her child. Another opinion pole reported in Nvws-
NWEK, Mar. 20, 1967 at 72-73 dealt with a nationwide survey of Catholic
opinion. As a part of this survey attitudes towards abortion law reform weresolicited and 58% of the laymen surveyed supported the church's general
opposition to reducing criminal law prohibitions upon abortion, 28% opposed
this position, and 14% were found indifferent. Attitude toward abortion in
particular cases varied considerably. Of those interviewed only 10% would
deem abortion justified where a girl became pregnant on a weekend visit
to an army camp, while 46% would deem it justifiable following rape, and
58% would deem it justifiable to save the life of the mother.
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ground rules in regard to sexual conduct. The point will not be
pressed here at length, but it is quite unsound to adopt as a matter
of rational public policy the position that the proper punishment
for violating the sexual ethics is to bear unwanted children. Par-
enthood should not be deemed a form of punishment.
What I have sought to show here briefly is that the reservoir
of ill feeling towards abortion is probably the product of emotional
forces and not a rational, deliberate thinking through of the prob-
lems involved. I would suggest that it is the duty of the lawmaker
seriously to question whether a general policy antagonistic towards
remitting abortion decisions to the perogatives of private decision
is justified on such bases.
A society that seeks to promote morality should not strip its
citizens of the power to make moral decisions. A man wearing
mittens can hardly learn to play a piano. A mature mind, similarly
incumbered, cannot develop the strength and moral fibre necessary
in a free society. A sound policy in regard to abortion would allow
this decision to be made by the private judgment of the persons
most directly involved. If the state is seriously concerned that this
operations is so unique that it demands particularly cautious and
mature consideration, a range of simple procedures may be pre-
scribed to insure this. Such procedures might involve a simply
verification presented to the physician and placed upon file that
the patient concerned has counselled with a clergyman or other
moral advisor before undertaking the operation. More elaborate
review procedures patterned after the laws of the Scandinavian
countries where there is considerable review by medical and social
welfare personnel could provide a more cumbersome alternative.
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